The intelligence failure preceding the Gulshan cafe terror attack is obvious and glaring. Planning an attack like this would mean recce of multiple sites, selection of the assault team, coordination between multiple modules of the terror group, meaning a lot of ‘extremist chatter’ on mobile and cyber space, unless the terrorists are using physical couriers for communication.
Failure to pick up a lead in the run-up to such an attack is disappointing. It points to lack of intelligence penetration into jihadi networks, especially those that emerged, apparently, after the Shahbagh movement in 2013.
A comparison to Mumbai 2008 is obvious. The RAW had warned the Indian government at least thrice but the former National Security Adviser M K Narayanan allegedly overlooked them. So the intelligence did not miss the impending threat to Mumbai; the man at the helm missed the leads provided by his sleuths because, as a former Intelligence Bureau chief involved in turf wars with RAW, his natural inclination was to ignore the RAW. No wonder, Narayanan paid the price along with Home Minister Shivraj Patil after Mumbai 2008, and no heads rolled at RAW or IB.
In Bangladesh’s case, it may be too early to comment but I strongly suspect the agencies were busy tracking the ceaseless attacks on soft targets across the country in the past weeks.
Having said that, Bangladesh responded brilliantly to the crisis, much better than what the Indians had done in Pathankot in 2015 and Mumbai in 2008. It helps to have a clear chain of command in a non-federal country – the state-Centre tension in India creates a huge problem.
The Bangladesh police did what the Mumbai police had done – brave officers took on the terrorists on their own in a knee jerk reaction and some paid with their lives.
Then after a quick review, the Bangladesh government decided on a full scale military assault. Knowing her instincts, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is a more decisive leader than Manmohan Singh (Indian PM during Mumbai) and authorised the para-commando assault without wasting time.
Failure to pick up a lead in the run-up to such an attack is disappointing. It points to lack of intelligence penetration into jihadi networks, especially those that emerged, apparently, after the Shahbagh movement in 2013.
A comparison to Mumbai 2008 is obvious. The RAW had warned the Indian government at least thrice but the former National Security Adviser M K Narayanan allegedly overlooked them. So the intelligence did not miss the impending threat to Mumbai; the man at the helm missed the leads provided by his sleuths because, as a former Intelligence Bureau chief involved in turf wars with RAW, his natural inclination was to ignore the RAW. No wonder, Narayanan paid the price along with Home Minister Shivraj Patil after Mumbai 2008, and no heads rolled at RAW or IB.
In Bangladesh’s case, it may be too early to comment but I strongly suspect the agencies were busy tracking the ceaseless attacks on soft targets across the country in the past weeks.
Having said that, Bangladesh responded brilliantly to the crisis, much better than what the Indians had done in Pathankot in 2015 and Mumbai in 2008. It helps to have a clear chain of command in a non-federal country – the state-Centre tension in India creates a huge problem.
The Bangladesh police did what the Mumbai police had done – brave officers took on the terrorists on their own in a knee jerk reaction and some paid with their lives.
Then after a quick review, the Bangladesh government decided on a full scale military assault. Knowing her instincts, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is a more decisive leader than Manmohan Singh (Indian PM during Mumbai) and authorised the para-commando assault without wasting time.
